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THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT:
QUESTIONABLE PREMISES AND PERVERSE INCENTIVES
KEITH

I.

N. HYLTON & VINCENT D. ROUGEAU*

INTRODUCTION
Having just passed the twentieth anniversary of the enactment of the

Community Reinvestment Act I ("CRA" or "Act"), this is an appropriate
time to take stock of the effectiveness of the legislation and to consider
whether it continues to be useful as a tool for addressing the problems of
neighborhood decline and discrimination in the lending market. Although
discrimination in lending and the decline of certain inner-city neighborhoods
is a problem that the CRA has not been able to solve, most observers would
agree that the situation has improved since the mid-1970s. 2 In particular,3
there has been notable progress toward the elimination of explicit redlining
- a problem the CRA was designed to address. 4 Perhaps it is impossible to
demonstrate what portion of that progress is due to the CRA itself and what
is a result of broader economic and social change that has occurred in this
country over the last twenty years. Nevertheless, both supporters and
opponents of the CRA generally agree that the Act has been an important
factor in pushing banks to lend in previously under-served areas.5
Keith N. Hylton is a Professor at Boston University School of Law, Boston,
Massachusetts; he can be contacted by e-mail at knhylton@bu.edu. Vincent D.
Rougeau is an Associate Professor at Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana.
The authors thank participants in workshops at Boston University and the University
of Southern California Law Center for helpful responses to this paper. The authors
thank the Center for New Black Leadership for financial support and Deborah Loesel
for research assistance.
I Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1994).
*

See Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act after Fifteen Years: It
Works, But Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
293, 310 (1993).
3 See id. at 303-04 (describing efforts to increase better lending performance).
4
See id.; A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered,
2

143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431, 1453 (1995).
5 See Fishbein, supra note 2, at 294; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 347
(1993); see also Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic
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In this paper we will argue that the CRA as it is currently understood
and enforced is no longer an appropriate tool for dealing with discrimination
in the lending market and the lack of access to credit in neighborhoods
dominated by minorities and people of modest, or minimal, means. The
statute is based on premises that are questionable in today's lending market,
and thus it is not clear that the social benefits provided by the statute are
significant. Further, enforcement of the statute generates certain perverse
incentives that are costly to society. We emphasize the costly incentive
effects in this paper.6 While the goals of the CRA remain desirable, the
current enforcement framework should be reformed.
H.

THE CRA DEBATE AND THE REVISED CRA
REGULATIONS
A.

Background on the CRA Debate

The Community Reinvestment Act, enacted as Title VIII of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, requires appropriate
federal banking regulators to "encourage

. .

. [financial] institutions to help

meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered
consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions." 7 The
Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and
Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1463, 1488 (1994) (discussing bank

agreements with community groups in under-served communities).
6 Since the passage of the CRA, there have been several law review articles
examining the desirability of the legislation from an economic perspective. See, e.g.,
Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination:Economic Theory,
Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237
(1996); Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 291; Peter P. Swire, The Persistent
Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 787 (1995); Taibi, supra note 5, at 1465; Lawrence J. White, The Community
Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM
URB.L.J. 281 (1993).
In writing this paper, we set out to make two contributions to this literature.
First, we wanted to state the premises or assumptions of the CRA's proponents in a
reasonably (or highly) defensible form and examine those premises in light of
current market conditions. We thought that there was a tendency in some of the
economic critiques of the CRA to put the proponents arguments in a weak form.
Second, and most important, we wanted to provide a careful statement of the
incentive effects of the statute. The earlier articles on the CRA have not provided as
careful an analysis of the incentive effects as we provide here.
7 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1994).
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statute provides that regulators should evaluate a financial institution's CRA
performance "when examining financial institutions" and that regulators may
take CRA performance into account "in an application for a deposit
facility."&
From the perspective of the banking industry, the heart of the
argument against the CRA focuses on its cost. The CRA imposes an
enormous regulatory burden on banking institutions, which requires
extensive data collection and record keeping. 9 In recent years, profound
changes in the banking marketplace have meant that banks and savings banks
have been bearing the burden of CRA compliance, while other non-banking
institutions have been able to enter the lending market free from any
responsibilities under the Act.10 Simply put, this provides a major cost
advantage to many institutions that compete against banks and savings banks
for a share of the lending market. Furthermore, CRA enforcement has been
primarily through protests of bank expansion applications by community
groups, which has caused many institutions to acquiesce to expensive
demands in order to avoid negative publicity or major delays. 1 On a more
theoretical level, many in the banking industry are philosophically opposed
to "credit allocation," or government-mandated lending to specific groups or
geographic areas, and believe that a competitive market for financial services
would be more effective than the CRA in addressing the problems of lending
12
discrimination and redlining.
Community groups have insisted over the years that the regulators
have not held banks accountable on their CRA performance and it is only

8

12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2).

9

See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 324-25 (stating that "[b]ankers today

.....
regard the CRA as the single most costly regulation facing them

).

See Ralph T. King Jr., Skewed Marketing: Some Mortgage Firms Neglect Black
Areas More than Banks Do, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1994, at A4 (noting that
10

unregulated mortgage bankers make up 75 of the 100 largest mortgage lenders;
however, 50 of those 75 showed "deficient" levels of lending in black areas). The
disparate application of the CRA also has been criticized on a conceptual level. See,
e.g., Leonard Bierman et al., The Community Reinvestment Act: A Preliminary
Empirical Analysis, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 406-07 (1994) (noting that the CRA
"regulatory tax" discriminates in favor of non-banks); Overby, supranote 4, at 1442
(pointing out that the CRA provides no justification for why only certain types of
institutions were selected for coverage).
II See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 333-34; Taibi, supranote 5, at 1487-88.
12 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 333-34.
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through outside pressure that any real change has occurred. 13 These groups
have generally urged tougher enforcement of the CRA by calling for public
disclosure of examinations and strong sanctions for poor CRA performance,
such as civil money penalties and cease and desist orders.14 These groups
argue that in order for the CRA to have any real effect, it has to be more than
an aspiration; the legislation has to be given some teeth. Community groups
want the CRA to produce tangible results, and they want recalcitrant
15
institutions forced to improve.
These conflicting views on the CRA came to a head over the last few
years, following the 1992 election of President Clinton and the 1994 election
of a Republican Congress. President Clinton, along with most Democrats, is
a strong supporter of the CRA. On the other hand, most Republicans are
sympathetic to the banking industry's problems with the CRA and support
changes to the Act ranging from outright repeal to streamlined
enforcement. 16 In 1993, President Clinton called for a complete overhaul of
the CRA regulations then in effect.17 In 1995, the bank regulatory agencies
promulgated revised CRA regulations that were designed to address some of
the important concerns of the banking industry and community groups 18
These revisions were followed by a report from the General Accounting
Office ("GAO") to the Congress, which evaluated the effectiveness of the
Act and prospects for improvement under the new regulations.
See Richard P. Marsico, Fighting Poverty through Community Empowerment
and Economic Development: The Role of the Community Reinvestment and Home
Mortgage Disclosure Acts, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 281, 282 (1995) (arguing
that the objectives of community groups are thwarted by weak enforcement of the
CRA).
14 See id. at 297 (explaining that although community groups have used the CRA
to secure funding for development projects, they are unable to meet all of the needs
perceived within low-income communities).
13

15

See JACK M. GUTrENTAG & SUSAN M. WACHTER, REDLINING AND PUBLIC

POLICY 38 (1980) (writing that community groups are critical of banks for being too
conservative in their overall lending policies, having an insufficiently local focus
within their defined service areas, and failing to provide broad enough lending
services).
16 See Steven Kalar, Note, Two Steps Back: British Lessons for American Fair
Lending Reform, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 139, 141 (1995) (discussing
the benefits of repealing the CRA).
17 See Kenneth H. Bacon, Clinton to Seek Rules to Cut Paperworkfor Banks, to
Boost Lending in PoorAreas, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1993, at B2.
18 See 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 228, 345, 563e (1997); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203 (regarding the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act).
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The GAO Report19

Ironically, after extensive discussions with all of key parties in the
CRA debate, the GAO found some general agreement about the major
problems with the Act. Four issues were identified: (1) the CRA relies too
heavily on documentation of efforts and processes and too little on lending
results, which leads to an excessive paperwork burden; (2) the regulators are
inconsistent in their conduct of CRA exams; (3) the examinations are often
based on insufficient information and may not accurately reflect an
institution's performance; and (4) the regulatory enforcement of the CRA0
relies too heavily on community group protests against expansion plans. 2
Of course, these groups do not necessarily agree on how the CRA should be
enforced and the affected parties differ on what they see as an effective
response to these problems. 2 '
For example, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA") data
provide information on lending results, but they also present numerous
interpretive problems. 22 The GAO found that many bankers were concerned
that HMDA data could be misleading if not properly explained and that some
of the information reveals too much about their business and should not be
publicly disclosed. 3 Bankers also objected to having to provide additional
data that they would not ordinarily generate as part of and which "may not
fully reflect their [normal] business activities." 24 The regulators believed
that statistical data were necessary for judging CRA compliance, but were
only useful if accurate.35 They also noted problems with HMDA data, which
they said were sometimes poorly kept or inconsistently reported. 26 The
limitations of the data make additional information essential, particularly
when an institution is not heavily involved in mortgage lending. 27 Finally,
there were concerns about the limited regulatory resources available for CRA
enforcement. Some examiners lacked the time or training necessary to
19 GENERAL ACCT. OFF. (GAO), GGD-96-23, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT:
CHALLENGES REMAIN TO SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT CRA B-259931 (Nov. 28,
1995) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
20 See id. at 44.
21 See id. at 44, 45.
22 See Hylton & Rougeau, supranote 6, at 274-79.
23 See GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 47.
24 Id.
25

26
27

See id. at 48.
See id.
See id.
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perform proper analyses of HMDA data.28 Many bankers complained that
the examiners' CRA reviews often were arbitrary and inconsistent. 29
The revised CRA regulations attempt to address some of the
problems noted in the GAO report. The CRA evaluation now focuses more
on the results of an institution's efforts to improve its community
reinvestment performance. 3 ° Larger institutions are rated under a three-part
test that evaluates lending, investment, and retail service throughout the
institution's service area based on standard quantitative data provided by the
institution. 3 1 The increased reliance on quantitative data in the evaluations
and a more results-based process are also designed to address the problem of
inconsistent evaluations. 2 Because small banking institutions have been
33
particularly concerned with the paperwork burden imposed by the CRA,
the revised regulations include a streamlined examination for small banks
evaluated based on a
and permits all banks to have their CRA performance
4
strategic plan approved by their regulator?
Despite these changes, dissatisfaction with the CRA remains. It was
the GAO's opinion that the revised regulations will not solve many of the
CRA evaluations will still involve
CRA's enforcement difficulties.
numerous subjective judgments by regulators and will still require the
sophisticated analysis of quantitative data.3 5 The GAO was concerned about
the ability of the regulatory agencies to devote the staff and other resources
necessary for truly effective enforcement of the Act0 6 Although many
parties involved agree the revised regulations should be given a chance to
work, there is a general feeling that total reevaluation of the Act may be
37
necessary.
The role of community groups also presents a significant problem in
the CRA scheme. These groups have a wide variety of goals and represent

28

See id.

29

See id. at 46.

See id. at 50.
See id. at 36-38.
32 See id. at 55, 59. The GAO also noted that training and examiner judgment
would be key to increased consistency in examinations. See id.
33 See id. at 35.
34 See id. at 39-40.
30
31

35
36

See id. at 51-52.
See id. at 62-64.

37 Informal discussions that the authors have had with CRA officers of banks from
the Chicago metropolitan area earlier this year tend to support this assessment.
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different constituencies3 8 Although all probably agree that the banking
industry should be pushed to increase community lending, they do not agree
on the methods. Community lending initiatives that satisfy some groups are
not acceptable to others? 9 Many of the groups have noted that enforcing the
CRA mandates is limited to denying an institution's application for
0
expansion or generating negative publicity following a low CRA rating. 4
Bankers have argued, on the other hand, that a CRA rating of "satisfactory"
or better should shield them from protests 4 1 and the current system creates
perverse incentives that discourage community lending.42 We note that this
problem presents a substantial challenge to the current CRA framework, not
only because it may keep banks out of certain neighborhoods, but also
because of the distasteful political posturing it tends to generate. 43 Although
the revised CRA regulations create a more objective standard for rating a
bank's community lending performance, many community groups no doubt
will continue to argue that banks receiving "satisfactory" or better ratings
from the regulators still are not doing enough and that public pressure
through negative publicity remains necessary. The conflicting demands of
the banking industry and community groups make it extremely difficult to
create regulations that satisfy all of the affected constituencies. The GAO
concluded:
The varied positions taken by the affected parties further
demonstrate that the debate about how best to achieve the
goals of community reinvestment is both complicated and
contentious. The approach embodied in the current CRA
statute uses the levers of compliance examinations and
application approvals to increase community reinvestment
lending. The new regulations are an attempt to generate
better results with less regulatory burden. However, given

For example, in Boston, some of the groups involved in ensuring community
lending include those organized around specific neighbors, such as the Codman
Square Neighborhood Development Corporation, and those organized around
specific constituencies, such as the Union Neighborhood Assistance Corporation.

38

See Bad Credit in Dorchester,BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1996, at A14.
39 See GAO REPORT, supra note 19, at 35.
40 See id.at 49.
41 See id. at 6.
42 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 340.
43 See Hylton & Rougeau, supranote 6, at 281.
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the positions of the different parties, it is not clear that the
44
results will fully satisfy all of those parties.

M.

QUESTIONABLE PREMISES

The current impasse regarding the CRA can be traced to some
questionable premises underlying the statute, particularly given the economic
and social realities of the 1990s. The oft-repeated idea behind the CRA is
that financial institutions sometimes fail to meet the credit needs of the
communities in which they are located. 5 Of course, this is a vague charge.
How does one define the credit needs of the community? Who defines these
credit needs? No one has provided a clear answer to these questions.
However, the basic sense of failure that motivated legislators to enact the
statute can be described easily. Proponents of the legislation were concerned
that depositors in older, minority-populated areas of inner-cities saw very
little of their money return to their communities in the form of business loans
or home mortgages. 4 6 The implication is that those loans typically were
provided to mortgage applicants and businesses located in wealthier
47
neighborhoods.
Thus, in the eyes of the CRA's proponents, banks were reluctant to
provide loans to applicants from inner-city, minority communities but they
were quite willing to accept risk-free deposits from the same people. This
coupled with the economic decline of most inner-cities during the late 1960s
and 1970s 48 gave rise to the view that banks were facilitating a process of
disinvestment in inner-city communities.4 9 Some proponents envisioned that
GAO REPORT, supranote 20, at 89.
See id. at 16.
See Marsico, supra note 14, at 287-88 (citing congressional intent, while
drafting the CRA, to have banks return more credit to their communities).

44
45
46

See Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 298-99.
See Michael P. Conzen, American Cities in Profound Transition: The New City
Geography of the 1980s, in THE MAKING OF URBAN AMERICA 277, 283-85
47
48

(Raymond A. Mohl ed., 1988) (analyzing various factors that contribuied to the
impoverishment of cities); see also John D. Kasarda, Inner-City Concentrated
Poverty and NeighborhoodDistress: 1970 to 1990, 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 253

(1993) (stating, "[r]esults show that despite some encouraging, individual city
turnarounds in the Northeast urban poverty concentration and neighborhood distress
worsened nationwide between 1980 and 1990.").
49 See Overby, supranote 4, at 1446; Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The
Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: ConcentratedPoverty in Urban
America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1311 (1995); see also Taibi, supra note 5, at
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the statute would reverse this trend by forcing banks to lend in relatively
50
under-served areas.
Because banks typically make loans not out of altruism but out of an
intention to make a profit, it is important to point out why in the eyes of
proponents banks were reluctant to lend in inner-city, minority communities.
The term "redlining" has been used to describe the policies of banks, but the
fundamental claim is that lending institutions discriminated against minority
applicants or applicants from minority neighborhoods s l Prior to the
enactment of the CRA, there was some empirical evidence to support this
charge. Much of it is referred to in the legislative history of the Act, 52 and it
convinced many people that some type of action was necessary.
This is the account - call it the community disinvestment story - that
CRA advocates generally have accepted and continue to believe, and it
contains three premises. First, banks should lend primarily in the areas in
which they receive deposits. Second, banks refuse to do this largely because
of discrimination against minority groups. Third, the economic decline of
many inner-city, minority communities is due in substantial part to the
lending policies of banks.
The first premise - that banks should lend in the communities where
they receive deposits - has been criticized by Macey and Miller,5 3 and
although we do not agree entirely with their argument,5 4 we would point to
the same flaws in the premise that they have identified. The fundamental
flaw is that the "localism" premise confuses the role of banks as financial
intermediaries. The premise rests on an assumption that banks should aim to
do their business locally. But in their role as financial intermediaries, banks
recently have not attempted to conduct their business on a local basis. 55
Given a set of risk and return characteristics banks would consider acceptable
for lending, they transfer money from geographic markets in which there is
1484-86 (noting that "banks were redlining or neglecting important credit needs
within their communities, and regulators' efforts to deter such behavior were
inadequate.").
50 See Schill & Wachter, supra note 49, at 1316-20.
51 See Overby, supra note 4, at 1450.
52 See id. at 1453 (in a review of banking and credit legislation of the 1970s,
describing the CRA as the "linchpin in the effort to ameliorate the problems of
discrimination, redlining, and disinvestment"). For a thorough discussion of the
history of the CRA, see Overby's comments at pages 1453-58.
53 See Macey & Miller, supranote 5, at 310-12.
54 See Hylton & Rougeau, supranote 6, at 264-65 (discussing localism argument).
55 See Macey & Miller, supranote 5, at 305-06.
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56
an excess supply of funds to those in which there is an excess demand
Because communities differ in terms of lending risks and in terms of savings
propensities, this implies some communities will receive fewer loans relative
to their deposits than other communities. Further, banks increasingly solicit
funds nationwide, 57 which makes it more difficult today to make a general
claim that local funds are being lent outside of the community.
The localism premise has been discussed at length elsewhere, 58 and
we will not extend the debate here. The second and third premises (dealing
with discrimination and causation, respectively) strike us to be more
important, so we will focus on them in this section.

A.

Assessing the Plausibility of the Lending Market
Discrimination Theory

The literature on the economics of discrimination has offered two
categories of discriminatory motive. One is taste-based discrimination,
which refers to discrimination based solely on the discriminator's disutility
or distaste for contact with members of the target group. 59 The other type of
discriminatory motive is statistical or rational discrimination, which occurs
when the discriminator uses race as a proxy for other information that would
influence his decision.6 °
56
57

See, e.g., JAMEs L. PIERCE, THE FUTURE OF BANKING 19-20 (1991).
See Macey & Miller, supranote 5, at 305-307.

58

See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 264-65; Macey & Miller, supra note 5,

at 303-12; Overby, supranote 4, at 1483-9 1.
59 Much of the literature regarding the "economics of discrimination" is due in
large part to the work of Gary Becker. For information on taste-based
discrimination, see GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16-17
(2d ed. 1977). For a detailed discussion of the taste theory in the context of lending
discrimination, see Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 250-59. A taste-based
discriminator is willing to offer a payment, or to bid, to avoid contact with members
of the group he dislikes. Thus, suppose a taste-based discriminator plans to see a
certain movie - he can choose between two theaters close to his home. One theater,
A, is frequented only by members of the group he likes (presumably his own group).
The other theater, B, is frequented by members of the group he dislikes. The tastebased discriminator will choose B over A only if the price charged by B is
sufficiently lower than the price charged by A to compensate for the disutility of
associating with members of the group he dislikes.
60 See, e.g., Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of
Discriminationin Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1977); Edmund
S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659
(papers and proceedings) (1972). For a discussion of statistical discrimination in the
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In the context of the lending market, one can subdivide these
categories of discrimination further still. A lender could discriminate against
an applicant because of information about the applicant or because of
information about the intended use of the loan. For example, a lender may
be reluctant to extend credit once he finds out that the applicant is black.
Alternatively the lender could be indifferent as to the race of the applicant,
but unwilling to lend after learning that the loan would enable the applicant
to purchase a home in a neighborhood with a high percentage of black
residents.
It could be seen as needless hair-splitting to create so many
categories for examining discrimination, but these categories are useful in
examining the plausibility of the discrimination premise. Let us start by
considering the claim that lenders are taste-discriminators who focus
primarily on the intended use of the loan. What this means is that a lender
simply dislikes extending credit intended to fund activities in minority
communities.
This argument has a ring of implausibility. The taste-based
discrimination theory is typically applied to the case of an employer who
prefers not to associate with workers of a different race.61 The taste-based
theory seems plausible in this setting because people generally come in
contact with each other at the worksite. However, a loan officer can approve
a loan going to support a business or home purchase in a minority
community without ever having to set foot in the community.
Consider the theory that banks are reluctant to lend to individual
minority applicants because of taste-based discrimination against the
applicant. This is somewhat more plausible than the previous theory because
bank employees sometimes come into contact with loan applicants or the
holders of bank loans. However, as the lending process becomes
increasingly mechanized, and as discretion plays a less important role in the
process, 62 even this theory of discrimination begins to look less plausible. In
today's lending market, there are mortgage brokers who shop around an
information package on a home mortgage applicant that is largely confined to
financial matters. The lenders who accept these packages often know
context of lending, see Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 254-59. It should be
clear from the discussion in the text that the statistical discriminator has no racial or
group-based preferences; he simply uses group-identification as predictor of
behavior.
61 See Hylton & Rougeau, supranote 6, at 249-54.
62 See Snigdha Prakash, MortgageLenders See Credit Scoring as Key to Hacking
Through Red Tape, AM. BANKER, Aug. 22, 1995, at 1, 10.
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nothing of the non-financial personal characteristics (e.g., race) of the
applicant. Credit scoring 6 3 and other mechanical processes, have become
sufficiently common that the theory of64taste-based discrimination in the
lending market has become less plausible.
Still, mechanization of the lending process has not reached the stage
that the non-financial personal characteristics of borrowers can be assumed
to be irrelevant to the lending process. The interesting question is how tastebased discrimination occurs in the lending process. The most persuasive
account provided so far was suggested in the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston's study of residential lending discrimination. 65 The study points out
the importance of borderline applicants in the mortgage process: according to
the study's authors roughly eighty percent of mortgage applicants are neither
unambiguously good risks nor unambiguously bad risks by traditional
standards, 66 and within this large group of borderline applicants the
discretion of the loan officer is applied. In this setting, there is room for
taste-based discrimination to occur in spite of the existence of rigid
assessment standards and laws prohibiting racial discrimination.
The remaining theories of discrimination fall under the statistical
discrimination category. We think it is fair to say that the statistical
discrimination theory is more plausible in the context of the lending market
than is the taste-based theory. The key weaknesses in the taste theory are
that it requires the exercise of discretion on the part of the lender and direct
contact between the discriminating lender and customers. But both of these
features are no longer routine in the mortgage lending process and are
becoming increasingly less common.
Scoring systems use data from previous loan applicants and recipients to
generate models that rate borrower attributes to determine creditworthiness. For a
brief overview of credit scoring usage and a discussion of policy implications, see
Warren L. Dennis and Christine DiBacco Bachman, Are DOJ and FTC Poisedfor
FairLending Attack Against Credit Scoring? 14 BANKING POL'Y. REP. 1 (1995).
63

64 Of course, one could argue that mechanical processes in general remain flawed
because they incorporate the discriminatory tastes of the programmers of the various
mechanical methods. But under the model of taste-based discrimination, the
important source of discrimination is the decision-maker's distaste for dealing with
an undesirable group. If that distaste were incorporated directly into some algorithm
for determining creditworthiness, the lender would, presumably, still have discretion
as to whether to follow the algorithm. If the lender had no taste for discrimination, it
(presumably) would deviate from the rules set out in the algorithm.
65

See ALICIA H. MUNNEL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING

HMDA DATA (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper Series No. 92-7, 1992).
66

See id. at 12.
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Furthermore, there are implications from the economics of
discrimination literature that support the lending market statistical
discrimination thesis. 67 Perhaps the most important concerns the long run

survivability of discrimination. The basic result is that in the long run, taste68
based discriminators will earn less than competitive returns.
To see why this holds true, let us step back for a moment and review
some basic lessons from the theory of competition. In a competitive market,
entry occurs until economic profits - the difference between revenue and the
opportunity costs of capital used in production - are driven to zero. 69 Thus,
in the long run, firms earn zero economic profits? ° They earn what
economists describe as a "normal" profit, which is just enough to compensate
them for the risk and the opportunity cost of capital tied up in the
enterprise.

71

Now consider what happens to the discriminator in an industry in
which new competitors can enter easily. The taste-based discriminator
demands to be compensated for the distaste or disutility he experiences in
having to deal with or come into contact with members of the race he
dislikes. In the employment context, the white taste-based discriminating
employer would demand a wage reduction (relative to the wage paid to a
white worker) in order to employ a black worker. In the lending market,
taste-based discriminating lenders will demand a premium, in the form of a
higher interest rate or higher up front fees, for dealing with black loan
applicants. Because of his demand for compensation, the taste discriminator
will of course earn a larger profit in each individual contract with a black
loan applicant. However, this demand also puts the taste discriminator at a
competitive disadvantage relative to non-discriminating lenders. Because
they do not need to receive a premium to compensate for the distaste of
dealing with black borrowers, non-discriminating lenders will be able to
enter into a larger number of profitable contracts and may underprice
discriminating lenders when dealing with black loan applicants. Put another
67

See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION

INLABOR MARKETS

3, 24-26 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973); Becker,

supra note 59, at 39-54.
68 See Becker, supra note 59, at 39-54.
69 See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 202-03 (4th ed.

Prentice-Hall, 1988).
70
71

See id.
See id.; see also KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF

MICROECONOMICS, 195-96 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that a normal rate of profit is "the
rate that is just sufficient to keep owners or investors satisfied").
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way, taste-based discrimination gives rise to opportunities for nondiscriminators to make "racial arbitrage" profits.
Suppose, for example, that a taste-based discriminator is willing to
a
make loan to a black home mortgage applicant only if compensated by an
additional quarter of a percent on the interest rate or an up-front fee equal to
one percent of the amount borrowed (one "point"). If the lender attempts to
disguise the racial surcharge by incorporating it into the interest rate, then his
strategy is likely to be undone by competitors in the market for refinancing.
Indeed, if it were routine for black mortgage holders to be charged
uncompetitive interest rates by taste-based discriminators, non-discriminating
lenders would have incentives to target refinancing offers to black home
owners. Aware of the constraints in the refinancing aftermarket, the tastebased discriminating lender might demand compensation in the form of an
additional point at closing of the sale. But in this scenario the additional cost
is so obvious to the borrower that one would think that non-discriminating
lenders and mortgage brokers would be keen to exploit this opportunity.
If entry into the lending market by non-discriminators is easy, the
profits of taste-based discriminators in the lending market will be driven in
the long run below the point at which a normal profit is earned. At this point
there would be a potentially mutually-beneficial arrangement where
discriminators sell their assets to non-discriminators, or discriminators
simply exit the field and re-deploy non-specific capital to some other
activity. The long run tendency, then, is for the market to penalize tastebased discriminators. Unless they prefer to discriminate while receiving less
than competitive returns, they will tend to exit the field at a higher frequency
then non-discriminators, and thus make up a smaller share of the market over
time.
In the case of statistical discrimination it is not necessarily the case
that the market will penalize discriminating firms. If a firm uses information
on race as a cheap proxy for other information that is expensive to discover,
the firm may be able to improve its position relative to competitors who do
In other words, statistical
not take race information into account.
discrimination, provided race is a sufficiently accurate and cheap proxy for
information on risk, does not necessarily generate potential racial arbitrage
2
profits for non-discriminating lenders.
These implications for the survivability of discrimination can be
applied to the banking context in order to aid our assessment of the
plausibility of the discrimination hypotheses. On a superficial level the tastebased discrimination theory seems difficult to reconcile with the fact that
72

See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 250-51.
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banking is a competitive industry. 73 It is possible, to be sure, for taste-based
discrimination to exist in a competitive industry. There is nothing in the
theory of competition to suggest that taste-based discrimination cannot exist
in the short run, and even in the long run it may persist if taste-based
discriminators are willing to accept less than competitive returns. However,
the theory seems implausible in light of the scale of the allegedly
discriminatory credit allocation pattern. Given the consistency of the pattern
of decaying inner-cities surrounded by relatively wealthy suburbs, one would
think that there are enormous profit opportunities if this pattern is in
substantial part due to racial discrimination on the part of bank loan officers.
In addition, the empirical evidence does not provide support for the
taste-based discrimination theory. Recall that the taste discriminator would
demand a premium in order to deal with black borrowers. This generates a
racial arbitrage profit opportunity for non-discriminators, who can make
money by underpricing discriminators in the market for black borrowers.
Although these profits are eliminated in the long run through competition,
one should expect in the short run to see a positive relationship between bank
profitability and minority lending. A recent study by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System examined the relationship between lender
profitability and the minority composition of the neighborhoods in which
they made loans. 74 The report concludes that the "influence of the minority
composition of a neighborhood on risk or profitability is weak and
inconsistent, when other determinants of risk and profitability are accounted
75
for."
Direct examination of the behavior of presumptive nondiscriminators reveals little evidence that these firms behave differently from
the typical lender. Who are presumptive non-discriminators? In many large
cities, such as Chicago, there are black-owned banks.7 6 Whatever may be
said of them, it is highly unlikely that these banks are taste-based
discriminators against black loan applicants. However, among municipal
depositories in Chicago, within-city loan to deposit ratios are lower for
73
74

On the competitiveness of banking, see PIERCE, supra note 56, at 79-88.

See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REP. TO THE 103D
CONG. ON COMMUNITY DEV. LENDING BY DEPOSITORY INSTIT. 39-52 (1993)

[hereinafter COMMuNITY LENDING REPORT].
75
76

Id. at 39.

For example, in Chicago until roughly two years ago, there were three blackowned banks: Drexel National Bank, Independence Bank of Chicago, and Seaway
National Bank of Chicago. Drexel and Independence were purchased by the South
Shore Bank of Chicago (a white-owned bank) two years ago.
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minority-owned than for white-owned banks. 7 In general, minority-owned
banks tend to perform less well on CRA evaluations than white-owned
banks. 78 A study by Harold A. Black, M. Cary Collins, and Ken B. Cyree
presents evidence that black-owned banks are more likely to discriminate
against black loan applicants.7 9 Thus, black-owned banks seem to be as
reluctant to lend to black loan applicants as their white-owned counterparts.
From the foregoing, it seems that the taste-based discrimination
theory fails several simple preliminary tests of plausibility when examined in
the context of the lending market. This is not to say that there could be no
taste-based discrimination; this is an issue that deserves careful empirical
analysis. But at this preliminary level of probing, there is little support for
the theory that stands at the heart of the CRA's justification.
Recall that the alternative to taste-based discrimination is statistical
discrimination, which in the context of lending implies that banks use
information on race as a cheap substitute for more detailed information
bearing on creditworthiness. To the extent firms have set up mechanized
lending processes that do not incorporate information on the race of
applicants, there is less room for race to be used even as a proxy for other
variables that concern the lender. However, the large category of borderline
loan applicants opens up an area for banks to use race information informally
as a method of reaching decisions on marginal loan applicants.
Let us return briefly to the process described by the Boston Federal
Reserve Bank study.8 0 How would statistical discrimination affect lending
decisions on marginal or borderline loan applicants? Several commentators
8
have noted the phenomenon of "coaching" or the "thick file" phenomenon '
This refers to the fact that some borderline loan applicants receive help from
loan officers. In some cases the coaching pays off and a borderline applicant
who would otherwise have been rejected receives a loan from the bank.
Unsurprisingly, the evidence suggests that white loan applicants are more

See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 255.
See Robert B. Cox, Minority Banks Seen Lagging in CRA Arena, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 20, 1993, at 1.
79 See Harold A. Black, M. Cary Collins & Ken B. Cyree, Do Black-Owned Banks
DiscriminateAgainst Black Borrowers?, 11 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 189,202 (1997).
77
78

See MUNNEL ET AL., supra note 65, at 12.
See, e.g., COMMUNITY LENDING REPORT, supranote 74, at 34; Swire, supra note
6, at 819-20; LAWRENCE B. LINDSEY, BREAKING FREE FROM SOME OUTDATED
MYTHS, ADDRESS TO A COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT CONFERENCE 5-6 (Sept. 21,
1992) (transcript on file with author).
80
81
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likely than black applicants to receive this coaching and to have thicker
82
application files.

A loan officer who rationalizes his discriminatory behavior may
decide to favor white borderline applicants because he thinks they are more
likely to speak favorably of the bank to other desirable customers. Viewed in
this sense, the coaching process is similar to advertising. The bank views
these expenditures as investment in the firm's goodwill. If such investments
are likely to have higher payoffs when directed toward white applicants, the
coaching process is likely to be racially biased.
If this is an accurate description of the main source of racial
discrimination in the home lending market, then it is easy to see how it may
persist and also be difficult to discern. It may persist because it is profitmaximizing; every bank has an incentive to tolerate a race-biased process as
applied to borderline applicants. And since this process does not involve the
bank refusing to accept unambiguously good risks because of racial
discrimination, it is less likely that the sort of racially-motivated price
competition (driven by the existence of racial arbitrage profits) that mitigates
the effects of taste-based discrimination will be observed in this setting.
Discrimination is difficult to discern because in this case it involves
applicants who are not clearly qualified under traditional standards.
In short, there is a plausible discriminatory process at work in the
residential lending process. However, the process is considerably narrower
than the community disinvestment story envisions.
The community
disinvestment story fails to take into account the constraining effect of
competition on the ability of lenders to discriminate against minority loan
applicants. Competition in the lending market makes it costly for banks to
practice taste-based discrimination. The discrimination that does occur is
most likely of the statistical type and is practiced within the set of marginal
loan applicants. 83 In addition, if competition is sufficiently vigorous, the
statistical assumptions used by discriminators will have to be reasonably
accurate, otherwise the discriminators will be punished by the market.

82 See Swire, supranote 6, at 819-20.
83 For empirical support, see RAPHAEL W. BOSTIC, THE ROLE OF RACE IN
MORTGAGE LENDING: REVISITING THE BOSTON FED STUDY (Division of Research

and Statistics, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System Working Paper No.
1997-2, 1996). Bostic finds that "significant racial differentials exist only for
'marginal applicants and are not present for those with higher incomes or those with

no credit problems."'

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

B.

[Vol. 18:163

Bank Lending Practices Are Major Determinant of
Economic Decline in Inner-Cities

The third premise of the community disinvestment story is that
discrimination in lending has had a significant impact on the economic decay
of minority communities. The most persuasive argument for this claim relies
on the economic theory of externalities: lending for community investment
purposes has an external effect because each dollar invested into restoring a
home in a given block raises property values within the block8 4 Thus, the
private value of lending for community investment is likely to fall short of its
"social value." Banks will tend to do too little lending for community
improvement projects.
This is a general argument that applies to all community investment
projects, whether in white or minority neighborhoods. It suggests that in the
absence of some subsidization efforts by the government there may be too
little investment relative to the social optimum in community improvement
projects. Of course, the interest from home equity loans is tax deductible,
which suggests that the government already subsidizes some community
improvement projects. In addition, there is strong social or peer pressure
within many neighborhoods to make investments to maintain one's property.
Further, nuisance law prevents people from totally ignoring the interests of
others in maintaining their property.8 5 With all of these forces, it may well
be that the level of community investment by property owners is the same as
what would be observed in a world in which investors captured all of the
external benefits of their investments.
However, there is a potential under-investment problem, and it may
be particularly severe in minority neighborhoods.
If banks adopt
On externalities and residential lending, see Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at
256-58; Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A MarketOrientedAlternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561,
84

1570-71 (1995).

85 Nuisance law does not, in general, protect aesthetic interests. See Mathewson v.
Primeau, 395 P.2d 183, 189 (Wash. 1964) (refusing to require defendant to remove
swine and rubbish from land because nuisance law does not protect aesthetic
interests); Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d
357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (stating that nuisance law does not protect claim
to sunlight). However, if the defendant's failure to maintain their property creates
some disturbance which invades the property of a nearby home owner, that home
owner would have a valid nuisance claim against the defendant. If, for example, the
defendant's property became infested with rats, creating a danger to nearby home
owners, a nuisance action could be maintained against the defendant.
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discriminatory lending policies, it may be rational for even nondiscriminating banks to refuse to make loans in minority communities.
Knowing that the profitability of its loans are dependent on the willingness of
other banks to extend credit within a certain neighborhood, a nondiscriminating lender may think that there are too few non-discriminators to
make up for the shortfall in lending due to discrimination. In this case, the
externality problem may give rise to a pattern of disinvestment. In the
expectation that no substantial lending will be done within a minority
community, lenders may rationally expect property values to decline in
general. 86 In this case, investing in one property may raise its value and
those of others, but not enough to offset the sum of declines resulting from
the failure to maintain nearby properties.
Although we find this story plausible, it is not entirely persuasive.
The fundamental weakness in this account is that it puts the cart before the
horse by focusing largely on the role of bank lending in the community
investment process. How does the perception arise that there will be too
little investment in minority communities? If the perception arises from the
fact that within a certain community, there is too little investment by
homeowners and residents, then banks cannot be held accountable for the
lack of lending within that community.
Many of the social ills that lie at the base of the phenomenon of
urban economic decline can be characterized either as lifestyle issues or as
macroeconomic issues, and are unrelated to the lending policies of banks.
Consider the lifestyle issue. A single parent household, for example, is
unlikely to be one in which members of the household have time to do
simple home improvement or maintenance projects. A community in which
roving gangs paint graffiti on the sides of houses and buildings, and
otherwise abuse the property of others, is unlikely to be one in which
residents have an incentive to invest in property.
The broader point is that in the communities in which there is no
visible under-investment problem, one observes private, low-level individual
and coordinated efforts that serve to maintain property values. Neighbors,
realizing their common interests in maintaining the property, sometimes
share equipment and help each other with maintenance tasks. This level of
continual investment and coordination is supported by the expectation that
86 See, e.g., Swire, supra note 6, at 823-25 (describing "strategic discrimination"
where lenders fail to extend credit because of an expectation of falling property
values in the future due to an absence of lending in an area). See also Klausner,
supra note 84, at 1569 (stating that information drawn from prior sales in an area
helps facilitate transactions in the future).
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low-level maintenance efforts are necessary in order to be accepted within
the community, or, put another way, to be considered a good neighbor. One
also finds, in these communities, a level of family cohesion that permits
residents to expect a high degree of stability and public order. But in
communities in which a large share of the families have dissolved or are in
the process of dissolving, low-level investments to maintain property are
almost surely not going to be made. Property values probably will decline in
these neighborhoods, whatever banks do. In the absence of private,
individual efforts to maintain and improve property it is unlikely that bank
lending alone will be sufficient to maintain property values.
Similarly, the macroeconomic changes that have led to economic
decline in cities were in some cases the result of international trade,87 and in8
other cases the result of poor policies at the level of municipal government, 8
or a combination of both. To the extent that these forces drive private
investment decisions, banks enter the picture largely as facilitators, moving
the traffic along but not controlling its direction.
1V.

PERVERSE INCENTIVES

To this point we have criticized the key assumptions of many
proponents and the legislative framers of the CRA. We are, of course,
unable to prove that these premises are false; this requires empirical research.
Some empirical research has been done on the question of lending
discrimination, and for the most part it is inconclusive. 89 However, our aim
is not to reexamine the empirical literature; rather our aim to this point has
been to suggest a framework from which the empirical evidence should be
examined. We think the statute's premises are sufficiently questionable in
today's climate that in the absence of strong evidence supporting them, there
should be a presumption that the statute does not accomplish the goals
proponents have set out for it. And even if the evidence could be thought to
support the proponents' assumptions, the question remains whether there are
more effective or less costly ways to do this.
87 The most dramatic example is Detroit, Michigan, where the decline in the
market share of the U.S. auto industry led to large increases in unemployment over
the late 1970s. See JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE 19395 (1993).
88 For a review which stresses the poor policy decisions, see America's Cities,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 1998, at 17.

89 For a review of the empirical literature, see Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at
268-76.

1999]

CRA: QUESTIONABLE PREMISES AND PERVERSE INCENTIVES

183

We shift our focus now to the inadequacies in the incentives created

by the statute. Thus, whether or not the premises are false, we ask here
whether the statute is likely to accomplish its aims at a reasonable cost.
Several commentators have suggested that the CRA may fail to
provide the right incentives for banks to comply with its aims, 90 provided
those aims can be stated with sufficient clarity. We consider this issue in
more detail here. The incentive problems can be grouped under two
headings: inadequate incentives and perverse incentives. Under the former
we will consider why the statute may provide insufficient incentives for
banks to meet the goals of CRA proponents. Under the latter, we will
discuss ways in which the statute actually works against the goals of its
framers and proponents.
A.

Inadequate Incentives

Under the current enforcement framework, banks and thrifts are
examined by one of the relevant federal regulatory bodies 9 1 for compliance
with the CRA and graded according to the level of compliance. Compliance
grades become an issue when the bank applies for approval for a merger, the
acquisition of a new branch, or some other expansion. To simplify the
discussion, we will focus on the merger as the relevant transaction. If the
bank has received poor compliance grades, the regulatory body may refuse to
approve the bank's merger application. However, the approval process is not
limited to a mere consideration of the bank's compliance grades. Third
parties are permitted to intervene and submit letters protesting the merger
because of the bank's failure to comply with the CRA. The statute permits
virtually anyone to intervene in this fashion. 92
With this background in view, it is possible to see some of the
obvious inadequacies in the current set of incentives. It should be clear that
90 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 295; Lawrence J. White, supra note 6, at
287.
91 The relevant agencies are: Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
On the structure of bank and thrift supervision, see R. GLENN HUBBARD, MONEY,
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE ECONOMY 55

(1994).

92 Regulations for the examining agencies indicate that "interested parties" may
file statements responding to applications for new domestic branches, relocations of
main offices, mergers, charters, conversions to national charters, and deposit
insurance. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.29(c) (1997) (OCC regulation); 12 C.F.R. § 345.29(c)
(1997) (FDIC regulation); 12 C.F.R. § 228.29(b) (1997) (Fed. Reserve Sys.
regulation); 12 C.F.R. § 563e.29(c) (1997) (OTS regulation).
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banks that do not have expansion plans do not have incentives to comply
with the CRA.
One might argue that it is the rare bank that does not have expansion
plans. However, banking industry analysts have noted that one by-product of
the recent wave of mergers is the expansion of the market's lower end. 93 As
banks have merged, casting off redundant facilities and workers, some of the
discarded assets and employees have found employment in banks serving
small geographic markets. Industry analysts have described the industry as
having a "barbell shape," with a mass of large banks serving large
geographic markets on one end, another mass of small banks on the other,
and relatively few medium-sized banks in between 94 At the lower end of
this barbell, there is virtually no need for managers to be concerned about the
CRA. Because these banks are catering to a narrow market and do not intend
to expand, they are effectively immune from the CRA enforcement process
thus giving them an advantage relative to large banks, partially offsetting the
disadvantage of not being able to exploit economies created by size in the
banking market.
With respect to large banks, it is not entirely clear that they will have
incentives to comply with the CRA. First, if the bank's managers have no
intention to expand, their incentives to comply are weakened. But even if the
bank's managers have expansion plans, or otherwise feel pressured to
comply with the statute, they may only comply with the letter rather than the
spirit of the statute. Banks no doubt study the methods regulators use to
grade compliance. Banks have incentives to adopt the cheapest methods
necessary to ensure approval or to avoid being put in an unfavorable public
light. That may give rise to compliance stratagems that ensure an adequate
compliance record without significantly furthering the goals of community
development.
A simple example illustrates this argument. Suppose regulators were
to measure compliance by comparing the total volume of loans in lowerincome communities to those in upper-income communities. Suppose the
bank serves two communities - the largely wealthy Park Place and the lowincome neighborhood, Marvin Gardens. The bank, aware that regulators will
compare the total amount loaned in these two communities, could construct a
good record under the regulator's criterion, either by reducing the amount
loaned in Park Place or by increasing the amount loaned in Marvin Gardens.
If, for example, Marvin Gardens has a small number of very expensive
93 See Nikhil Deogun, Back to the Fray: Displaced by Mergers, Some Bankers
Launch Their Own Start-Ups, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1996, at Al.
94 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 6, at 281.
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properties, the bank will want to extend credit to those owners. Of course,
making loans to a small number of wealthy property owners in Marvin
Gardens may enhance the bank's statistical compliance record while doing
absolutely nothing to improve the welfare of low-income home owners or
home searchers in Marvin Gardens. There are plenty of real world examples
in which such a compliance strategy is available to a bank. For example, the
"Gold Coast" area of Chicago includes pockets of concentrated poverty such
as the Cabrini-Green housing project. A Chicago bank that happens to have
one of these pockets of poverty within its service area would have a strong
incentive under the statute to lend large amounts to wealthy residents living
within the same service area. This does little to advance the goals of the
statute. Indeed, it has the perverse effect of providing benefits largely to
wealthy property owners in areas designated as "low-income," as banks bid
more aggressively for their business.
Since we are talking about cheap methods of avoiding problems
under the statute, why not consider what a smart bank manager would do?
Again, suppose we are in Chicago. A smart bank manager would call the
city council member who represents the residents within the lower-income
area of the bank's geographic market, and ask that representative to put her
in touch with local interest groups that would most likely file CRA
complaints in response to the bank's expansion plans. Having met the
concerns of the representative and the local interest groups, the bank would
be in a good position to seek expansion. Again, this approach toward
compliance may not advance the goals of the statute.
Perhaps the most troubling compliance stratagem revealed to date
involved Fleet Financial Bank of Boston. Although the allegations have not
been admitted to, reports emerged in the Fall of 1996 that the bank had
entered into deals with property speculators to buy homes in at least one lowincome area of Boston and to resell the homes to minority and low-income
residents at inflated prices 9 5 In one case, a house that had been bought for
$55,000 by a speculator was sold less than two months later, with no
improvements on record, for roughly $169,000.96 Since no rational bank
would approve a mortgage on an inflated house, this left Fleet in the position
of being the only bank that would lend to the unsuspecting home buyers.
Why would Fleet approve mortgages on inflated houses in a low-income

See Bad Credit in Dorchester, supra note 38, at A 14.
96 See Steve Tripoli, News Report (WBUR, Boston, Massachusetts radio broadcast,
Oct. 1997) (on file with authors).
95
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area? Reports suggested that the bank needed to improve its CRA
7
compliance record in order to carry out its expansion plans.
One could argue that a desirable result had been achieved: the bank
made more loans within a low-income neighborhood. But if the allegations
against Fleet are true, there may have been no social gain at all from the
bank's activity. The houses probably would have been sold to someone at a
price that could be supported by an independent appraisal. Fleet would not
have held as many loans in low-income areas, but other banks would have.
And what of the new owners of these inflated houses? They are burdened by
high mortgage payments and face the prospect of a large loss if they try to
sell.
The examples considered so far assume that the bank regulator uses
an objective or statistical test for compliance. Recent reform efforts have
attempted to make the compliance review process more objective.9 8 As these
examples demonstrate, objective compliance tests may provide incentives for
banks to adopt compliance stratagems that satisfy regulators' objectives
without really advancing the underlying goals of the CRA.
Suppose, however, we consider a more subjective review process
which focuses on banks' efforts to comply with the statute rather than
statistical evidence on lending. This is, of course, the traditional method
regulators have used to evaluate compliance. Is a subjective review process
preferable to an objective one because of the greater ability of regulators
under the subjective process to reject compliance stratagems that satisfy an
objective criterion while failing to genuinely advance the goals of the statute?
The answer probably is no.
Under a subjective review process, banks still have incentives to find
the cheapest methods to satisfy compliance examiners. As long as it is
cheaper to produce documentation and paperwork (e.g., glossy brochures)
97 See id; see also Kimberly Blanton, Regulators Studying Fleet Loan Practices,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 1995, at 85 (stating, "Federal bank regulators are

scrutinizing Fleet Financial Group Inc.'s minority lending practices as the company
seeks approval to buy Shawmut National Corp."); James S. Hirsch, Critics Say a
Well-IntentionedLoan Plan HelpedMinorities Buy OverpricedHomes, WALL ST. J.,
July 20, 1995, at BI (noting, "A bank program designed to aid minority-group
members get home mortgage loans is facing charges that it has hurt some of those
that it intended to help."); Jeffrey Krasner, Fleet, Codman Square Group Target
Lending Reforms, BOSTON HERALD, June 24, 1995, at 17 (indicating that "Fleet
Bank officials and members of a Codman Square community group yesterday agreed
to a sweeping array of mortgage lending reforms which both sides said could help
prevent excessive lending on overpriced properties").
98 See discussion infra Section V.B.
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than to take on risky loans, banks will have incentives under the subjective

process to invest in the production of paperwork indicating an effort to
comply rather than to actually extend loans to people in under-served
communities. Further, because of the actual risk efforts to extend loans may
not satisfy the examiner's unspecified concerns, banks have additional

incentives to focus exclusively on the production of paperwork. The result of
these incentives is a "community development" program in which most of
the funds are devoted to administrative salaries and expenses.
Perverse Incentives

B.

There are some ways in which the statute may serve to undermine its
own aims. While a bank that happens to be within a geographic market that
includes low-income residents may have enhanced incentives to work toward
the goals of the statute, a bank that does not lie within such a service area has
an incentive to stay outside. The statute clearly raises the cost of entering
and operating within the very markets which the legislative framers and

proponents claimed were under-served by banks.99 As fewer banks view
low-income areas as desirable markets, the remaining banks serving those
areas become less constrained by competition, permitting them to charge

uncompetitively high fees and to engage in the very discrimination the statute
aims to eliminate. This is a point that has been made before ° ° However,
the problem of perverse incentives runs considerably deeper. Let us return to
the focal point of CRA enforcement activity: the merger.
We noted earlier that the CRA is almost irrelevant to a bank that
does not have expansion plans. This happens because compliance grades are
important largely because they affect the likelihood of approval by regulators
for expansion plans. This particular enforcement convention introduces
important costs. We put them in two categories: rent-seeking and transaction
costs. We aim to point out below that incentives are created to run these
costs very high. There is no reason to think that these costs will not exceed
the social benefits from a merger.
Rent Seeking Costs

1.
a.

Banks

Consider the following example: bank A wants to acquire bank B,

where B serves a geographic market that includes a large percentage of lowincome residents. Bank A's merger application is under review by the
99 See 12 U.S.C. § 2901(2) (1994).
100 See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 340; White, supra note 6, at 287.
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Federal Reserve Board. Suppose there are competing banks, C and D, who
would also like to acquire bank B. Suppose there is another bank, E, who
competes against B but has no expansion plans.
Suppose further that the owners of A intend to reduce costs and
compete more fiercely after the merger, and the estimated gains to A from
this are $10 million ($1 million per year indefinitely discounted at 10%
interest rate). E's losses if this transaction takes place will be $3 million.
The competing bidders would each gain $5 million if they were permitted to
take over B. Consider their incentives under the merger approval process.
E's concern is that the merger may make B a stronger player in the
local market. C and D would like to knock A out of the competition for
acquiring B, though it may not be necessary to knock A out of the
competition. It may be sufficient, for their purposes, to delay the process so
that time-sensitive benefits from the merger between A and B evaporate.
C, D, and E have strong incentives to file protests under the CRA.
The value to each is substantial and the cost of filing a letter protesting the
merger is minimal. However, they have an incentive to invest considerably
more into the grievance process. E is willing to spend up to the expected
value of a successful challenge in order to prevent the merger, which in this
example is $3 million multiplied by the probability E's challenge is
successful. C will spend up to the value of $5 million multiplied by the
probability that C emerges as the acquirer, and the same is true of D. Let us
suppose the probability for either C or D emerging as victor is 1/2,
conditional on knocking A out of the game, so that each is willing to invest
up to $2.5 million into the protest. 10'
C and D will help their case by finding evidence that suggests that
the acquiring bank A either does not have a good compliance record, or is
unlikely to have a good compliance record in this market. They will also
have incentives to contact local interest groups and representatives and urge
them to protest the merger.
As this example suggests, the stakes involved can be high even in
small bank mergers. Because of the merger rents at stake for all of the
parties, the grievance process encourages banks to invest large sums into the
$2.5 million is the maximum the firms are willing to invest in the grievance
process. They will spend less if the probability of excluding bank A from the
process is less than one at all levels of expenditure. In general firms will choose a
level of expenditure that maximizes the gain from the grievance. Thus, if G is the
amount invested into the grievance process and p(G) is the probability of excluding
A given an expenditure of G, banks C and D will maximize the expression p(G)($2.5
million) - G.
101
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complaint process. Surely bank E, with as much as $3 million at stake, will
be able to discover important CRA concerns that should require regulators to
delay the merger approval process.
On a more general level, C and D have potential merger rents at
stake. E, seeking protection from competition, has a regulatory rent at stake.
It should be clear that by changing the numbers slightly the sum of the
merger and regulatory rents can easily exceed the total gain to A from the
merger, and perhaps all of the social gains from the merger.
Thus,
competition for merger rents and efforts to protect regulatory rents suggests
that the particular enforcement process set up under the CRA may generate
costs well in excess of the benefits. In addition, competition for rents drives
up the cost of bank entry into the very markets in which additional lending is
most desirable.
b.

Pressure Groups and Politicians

Several commentators have noted that local pressure groups have
incentives to demand payoffs from the merger applicant in order to withdraw
CRA protests against a particular merger. 02 They are aware that the merger
rents at stake are substantial. The payoffs required to quiet them are small in
relation to the merger stakes.
Local politicians are also aware of the opportunities created by the
CRA review process.' 0 3 Few things look more impressive to the public than
a public servant standing up against a powerful financial institution to force
that institution to take the interests of its potential customers into account.
Realizing this, the enterprising politico need not wait for the local pressure
groups to approach her; she can approach them first. She can volunteer to
serve as a mediator between the merger applicant and the local pressure
groups. With her guidance, the pressure groups can gain information on the
reasonableness of a settlement demand.
These costs are generally small in relation to the merger stakes.
However, to the extent this activity delays the merger process it can
significantly increase the likelihood that the whole deal will fall through.
2.

Transaction Costs

It is obvious that the transaction costs of a merger are increased by
the current enforcement framework, and thus fewer bank mergers will occur
as a result. Of course, this is true of virtually all regulations that affect

102
103

See Macey & Miller, supranote 5, at 333-34.
See id. at 296.
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mergers. One unique feature of the CRA is that it substantially increases the
transaction-specific investments made by the merger applicant. °4
Suppose the merger applicant is not discouraged by the prospect of
delay and the costs of responding to CRA complaints. Further suppose the
merger applicant invests large sums of time and money into making peace
with local politicians, pressure groups, local competitors, and all other parties
who raise CRA issues. At the end of this process, the bargaining landscape
between the potential acquirer and target has changed.
The target realizes that the merger applicant has made an enormous
investment in this single transaction. Of course, there are some general skills
that the applicant has learned. The applicant will be better prepared in the
future to negotiate mergers, having seen what is required in this one. But the
deals cut with complainants in this special case have no value to the bank in
future expansion applications in other areas.
For example, suppose at the start of the merger discussions, a price
of $50 million was offered and tentatively accepted by the acquisition target.
Suppose over the course of regulatory review, the value of the bank's assets
declines by $5 million. Note that the cost of walking away from the
transaction has increased for the merger applicant. If the target refuses to
lower its price, the applicant can refuse to carry out the transaction.
However, the target probably realizes that the acquiring bank does not want
to forfeit its heavy investment into CRA approval. The target is going to be
less willing to lower its price.
The point here is of course not limited to the CRA. To the extent
mergers have to meet any regulatory approval whatsoever, this creates a
transaction-specific investment which alters the bargaining positions of the
parties over the course of the regulatory review process. However, the CRA
is according to many accounts the most costly and time-consuming
component of the bank merger approval process.' 0 5 In addition, it involves
106
making investments that are quite useless in future expansion efforts
V.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE CRA

We do not know whether the costs of the CRA outweigh the benefits.
However, we have suggested so far that the benefits are considerably
narrower than proponents have envisioned. In addition, the administrative
costs by all accounts are high. What is more important in our view is that the
104
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See id.at 331.
See id.at 331-32.
See id.at 295-96.
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enforcement structure discourages banks from entering under-served markets
and sets up incentives to waste resources. In particular, parties have
incentives to exhaust the rents associated with the merger and regulatory
processes, and these costs provide an additional disincentive to entry.
Because the sum of these costs is likely to be large relative to the social
benefits from enforcement, it is probable that the total costs generated by the
statute exceed the benefits.
In this section, we briefly consider alternatives to the CRA. We start
with general views on desirable changes in the enforcement method and
move on to consider current legislative proposals.
A.

Changing Enforcement

It should come as no surprise that our most basic suggestion is that
the merger process be removed as a focal point for enforcement of the CRA.
In addition, we think there are several reasons for shifting to a subsidization
approach under the statute; for example, rather than penalizing banks for
having a poor compliance record, regulatory agents should only offer
rewards to banks that have strong compliance records. In terms of
compliance incentives, a subsidy is capable of achieving the same level of
compliance as a penalty. The incentive to comply with the CRA's goals is
determined by the difference between the reward for complying and the
penalty for failing to comply. Under the current framework, there is no
special reward for complying while the penalty is denial by regulators of an
application to expand the bank's activity. The same incentives can be
achieved by removing the penalty and substituting some reward for proving
compliance with the statute's goals.
There are several reasons for a change to a pure subsidy approach.
First, although the statute has been viewed by proponents as a useful tool for
combating discrimination in the lending market, that is not its sole focus. A
bank can prove that it has never discriminated against a lender on the basis of
the lender's race or the minority composition of the neighborhood for which
the loan is intended and yet still face the problem that its level of lending
may be deemed inadequate to meet the credit needs of its service area 0 7 As
many commentators have noted, banks that choose a conservative strategy,
or banks that choose not to make a substantial business of home lending, are
penalized. 108
To the extent that the statute constrains banks from pursuing
diversified strategies, it is equivalent to penalizing manufacturers for not
107
108

See Guttentag & Wachter, supranote 15, at 3.
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making a broader range of products. For example, if one were to follow the
logic of the statute's proponents and apply it to the auto industry, luxury car
makers should be penalized for not making cars that meet the needs of the
average consumer. But diversification in the car market, and most other
markets, has benefited consumers by permitting firms to meet consumer
needs more cheaply through specializing in narrow areas of the market.
In view of the benefits of specialization and diversification, the
proper approach by a government that aims to increase production of a
certain item is to subsidize either its production or consumption. The same
holds in the markets for lending to finance home purchases and business
expansion in inner-city communities.
Another powerful reason for a subsidization approach is observed
when we consider the long run effects of the CRA. In spite of the incentive
issues noted in the previous section of this article, the CRA may very well
encourage banks in the short run to do more lending in their service areas.
However, there is little doubt that the statute discourages banks from moving
into areas in which they will incur greater scrutiny under the statute. While
penalties discourage banks from moving into inner-city, minority
communities; subsidies would encourage them to move into these areas.
Banks would incur expenses in efforts to prove compliance with the CRA,
but this is not a concern under a subsidization scheme because the banks
would do so voluntarily in the expectation that the future rewards would
outweigh the compliance costs. If no bank attempted to comply with the
statute, then the government could infer that the costs of compliance were too
high relative to the subsidies.
Although we think a subsidy approach is superior to the existing
enforcement framework, it is not perfect. In particular, two general problems
are connected with a subsidy scheme. First, if the subsidy is provided
directly to banks - in the form of relaxed regulatory constraints, a reduction
in taxes, or an outright transfer payment - then the problems of inadequate
and perverse compliance incentives remain. Banks will be encouraged, as
they are now, to find cheap or fast methods of proving compliance with the
statute. Some of these methods, such as the scheme allegedly masterminded
by Fleet Financial Bank, 109 may do nothing to enhance community
development and leave borrowers worse off.
The second general approach to subsidization is to offer the reward
directly to borrowers who meet certain qualifications, perhaps in terms of
income or in terms of the neighborhood of the residence for which the loan is

109 See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.

1999]

CRA: QUESTIONABLE PREMISES AND PERVERSE INCENTIVES

193

intended. However, direct subsidies to consumers can also have some
undesirable incentive effects.
Suppose, for example, the subsidy is in the form of mortgage
110
insurance, such as that provided by Federal Housing Authority ("FHA").
Such insurance schemes may weaken the incentives of borrowers to protect
the value of the underlying asset, a problem generally known in the insurance
literature as moral hazard. Certainly one of the reasons a homeowner makes
investments in maintaining and improving one's property is to maintain or
enhance its value to a prospective buyer. If the homeowner's mortgage
payments are insured by the government, the option of stopping payments
and forfeiting the property will probably be less costly. As the costs of
letting the property decline in value fall relative to the costs of upkeep, one
should expect to see less effort put into maintaining the property. In addition
to the potential effect on the incentives of homeowners, an insurance scheme
has the more familiar moral hazard problem affecting banks: to the extent
that lenders are shielded from the consequences of default, they have
incentives to pass poor risks on to the public treasury.
Some of the problems outlined earlier in connection with the merger
process might reappear if a subsidy approach were used in connection with
expansion applications. Suppose, for example, the merger process is
streamlined for a bank with high CRA ratings. If third parties are allowed to
intervene and contest the bank's CRA performance, then some of the rentseeking behavior currently associated with the statute's enforcement would
remain. Although firms whose real reason for opposing the merger of two
rivals is fear of competition would no longer be able to use the CRA to block
the merger, they would still have incentives to file CRA protests in order to
delay the merger.

For single
family mortgage insurance, the FHA uses the value of the property to determine
eligibility. Maximum property values are set according to a percentage of the
median home price in an area, or according to the figures given in the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation Act. The FHA also has guidelines for maximum loan to
value ratios. FHA programs require an up-front mortgage premium payment, and
the term cannot exceed 30 years. See 24 C.F.R. § 203.18. The low cost and
moderate income mortgage insurance program sets eligibility according to income
levels and restricts the program to properties worth less than a given dollar amount.
See 24 C.F.R. pt. 221 (1998). For information on the development of government
mortgage insurance programs, see Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the
110 The FHA sponsors a number of mortgage insurance programs.

American Dream: A CriticalEvaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of
Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 394-96 (1994).
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These problems suggest that although a subsidy scheme would be
superior to the existing framework, it would not necessarily eliminate all of
the undesirable features observed in the present regime. Whatever its form,
any subsidy would have the desirable effect of removing the long run
disincentive, existing in the present enforcement regime, for banks to move
into areas that are currently considered to be under-served. Moreover, any
subsidy would remove the private compliance costs of banks as a political
issue, allowing a more open discussion of the societal costs of compliance
with statute. However, beyond these two significant benefits, the relative
merits of alternative subsidy schemes would have to be considered in light of
the incentive issues raised in each proposal.
The ideal subsidy would probably go directly to the purchaser in the
form of a fixed sum, in order to improve the purchaser's ability to meet the
requirements of lenders. Perhaps the simplest scheme would be a tax
deduction for individuals who purchase homes in certain communities. The
tax deduction approach could be expanded for money donated to funds or
firms that specialize in community development. The fixed-sum subsidy to
consumers would avoid the moral hazard issues raised above. In addition,
the fixed-sum to consumers, as a substitute to the current enforcement
approach, would entirely avoid the rent-seeking behavior described earlier in
this paper.
The subsidy to consumers would raise the problem of determining
the specific areas in which consumers could qualify for the tax deduction or
transfer payment. But this is an issue that can be resolved easily on a
statistical basis. Census figures would permit regulators to easily determine
the communities in which investment should be encouraged. Indeed, it
would be far easier to determine the communities in which investment should
be encouraged than to determine whether a particular bank had really made
serious efforts to lend in such a community.
B.

Comprehensive Community Redevelopment and Current
Legislative Proposals

An alternative to the pure subsidy approach outlined above is an
attempt to deal directly with the root causes of economic decline in inner-city
communities. To date, the one legislative proposal that combines a subsidy
approach to CRA enforcement with a comprehensive approach to revitalizing
these communities is the American Community Renewal Act of 1997, I1
111 See H.R. 1031, 105th Cong. (1997). A similar bill was introduced in the Senate

by Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.). See S. 432, 105t h Cong. (1997).

Portions of the

Renewal Act, including the education voucher program and funding for faith-based
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sponsored by Republican representatives J. C. Watts of Oklahoma and Jim
Talent of Missouri and Democratic representative Floyd Flake of New York.
The bill would create 100 "Renewal Communities" across the country and
would also focus on supporting families and rebuilding neighborhood
institutions in the areas selected.1 1 2 These communities would be chosen
113
based on the existence of pervasive poverty and economic distress.
Incentives such as tax credits, regulatory relief, and low-interest loans would
be offered to businesses and individuals who invested in these
neighborhoods. 114 By making certain approved types of investments in
Renewal Communities, banks would be able to satisfy their obligations under
the CRA. 115
Although the comprehensive-community approach of the WattsTalent proposal makes the mistake of keeping much of the current CRA
enforcement framework intact, it offers the hope of going considerably
further than would a subsidy approach in addressing the under-investment
problem. As we noted earlier, banks are unlikely to lend to businesses or
home purchasers in communities in which the local businesses and property
owners themselves are unwilling to invest.11 6 By increasing the level of
investment in declining communities, the bill would reduce the risk faced by
banks considering whether to lend in these communities. This, in turn,
should reduce the size of the subsidy needed to induce banks to increase their
lending.
Another active legislative proposal that seeks revisions to the CRA is
the Community Reinvestment Improvement Act of 1997. 117 Sponsored by
Republican representative Bill McCollum of Florida, the legislation sets forth
a modified evaluation procedure for certain mid-sized financial institutions
that have received CRA ratings of "satisfactory" or better and are in
compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. It also introduces what is
substance abuse treatment programs, have generated some opposition on churchstate separation grounds. For different viewpoints on the drug treatment program,
see Morning Edition: Community Renewal Act (National Public Radio broadcast,
Feb. 19, 1997). For arguments regarding the school voucher program, see J.C.
Watts, Jr., NAACP Loses Its Way on Education Rights, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1997,
at A18.
112 See H.R. 1031, 105'h Cong. §§ 2, 1400(a)(2)(A) (1997).
113 See id. § 102.
114 See id. §§ 2(b), 102.
115 See id. § 403.
116 See supra Section III.B.
117 H.R. 221, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997).
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known as a "safe harbor" provision, which would prevent the denial of
requests for new facilities on CRA grounds if an institution has received a
CRA rating of "outstanding" or "satisfactory" in the two years preceding the
request."l 8 The safe harbor concept has generated a great deal of controversy
over the last several years.19 As proposed in the Community Reinvestment
Improvement Act, the safe harbor simply allows institutions that have
performed well under the CRA to escape additional CRA scrutiny when they
20
expand.1
Safe harbor proposals solve only some of the CRA's problems. To
the extent they remove the merger process as focal point for enforcement,
they are desirable. However, they do little to affect the long run
disincentives for community development created by the statute. To remove
the disincentives, a subsidy or abandonment of the current enforcement
process is necessary.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The CRA, as it is currently enforced, is of doubtful value as a
mechanism for encouraging or promoting investment in economically
declining inner-city communities. The enforcement framework fails to
provide adequate incentives for banks to comply with the goals of the statute
and in some cases provides perverse incentives. It is time for Congress and
banking regulators to redesign the enforcement process with a view toward
subsidizing community investment efforts.

118 See id. §4.
119 Many opponents argue that safe harbors let financial institutions escape their
community lending responsibilities too easily. "Outstanding" and "Satisfactory"
CRA ratings are what the vast majority of financial institutions receive, therefore
safe harbors can make it very difficult for community groups to challenge an
institution's CRA performance. Safe harbor proponents, on the other hand, argue
that a bank which meets its CRA obligations should not be held hostage to the threat
of community group protests whenever it contemplates expansion.
120 See H.R. 221, 105' Cong. § 4 (1997).

